Theodore C. Bestor opened his article with a story of transaction of Tuna fish with a lot of buyers coming from New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maine. They examined these Bluefin tuna’s color and size before they called Tsukiji to ask the morning price. The buyers then gave the bid to the dock manager. The Bluefin Tuna were put into a “Tuna Coffin” and sent to Tokyo Tsukiji Market. Theodore C. Bestor used this case of Bluefin tuna as an indicator of Japanese culture and Sushi culture’s globalization.
Theodore C. Bestor believed that the globalization of Sushi Started in the 1970s, It became “not just cool, but popular”(p110), and Sushi culture even impacted the fashion in the U.S. But, suddenly, after the 200 miles fishing limitation affected the fishing industries around the world, the role of Japanese fishing industry totally changed into to a new field. Japan had to reduce their amount of distant water fleets. Therefore, they had to import tuna from other counties. in the 1990s,Japan suffered from their economic crisis ,and was not capable to import that much Tuna form American Bluefin Tuna producer. Fortunately, the American domestic demand of Sushi could settle this issue. According to this situation, a new international fishing industry founded.
Bestor claimed that this kind of globalization would bring the fishing communities into conflict with customers, governments, regulators, and environmentalists around the world. Bestor referred to examples to support his idea, such as In Spanish water, fishers have to abide by the regulation of the whole fishing industry and use the technology from Japan. By using Japanese fishing technology, some countries can benefit from this; therefore, other countries, such as Austria want to improve their technique too.
Next, Theodore C. Bestor believes that such globalization cannot homogenize the Japanese culture. Invisibly, mass of non-Japanese people helps to maintain Japanese identity. Such as,...